Last week, Turkish officials arrested the leading challenge expected to withdraw Tayyip Erdoğan in the next presidential elections of the country planned for 2028. He rejected the charges and motivated them politically. In response to the detention of Imamoglu, the country’s protests exploded on a scale that has not been seen at least in a decade. Erdogan has ruled Türkiye since 2003 and partially broke political opponents and the media to keep power. Some of these competitors come from the long -standing Kurdish minority of Türkiye; Last month, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), called on the long -standing rebellion against the Turkish government as part of a process that could potentially lead the group to dry and as a part of a process that could get rid of prison.
I recently talked to Professor Emerita at the University of Stockholm University of Stockholm and Jenny White, a specialist in modern Türkiye. During our speech for length and clarity, we discussed why Erdogan has now hit his opponent, that his rule has changed from the last two to ten years and the similarities and differences between the authoritarian style and Donald Trump.
With the arrest of Imamoglu, do you think that we have entered a new period of Erdogan’s rule, or does this feel the same?
I think this is definitely a new page. And it is very important whether this page will be translated. The result is still uncertain. However, if the page is returned – that is, if Erdogan manages to get rid of it – then Türkiye is no longer called the “competitive authoritarian” regime. This is a regime with real elections, but the elections are not completely fair because the government controls a giant part of the media or the media belongs to pro -state enterprises. In Türkiye, the opposition will never take real time on television and they cannot remove their messages through the media. So the elections are not fair. But there are elections and they still have a chance to work.
Despite everything, there is a real competition. But if Erdogan basically manages to get rid of the opposition candidate – and not only doing so, he also talks about the restructuring of the leading opposition party, the CHP – then there is no real opposition, no competition and you will not have real choices. And then you have a full autocracy. This is if you turn the page.
Why does Imamoğlu threaten Erdogan so much?
Well, there are some concrete things, his elections continue to win. The preliminary survey surveys in 2022 won the elections against İmamoğlu against Erdoğan. So why didn’t he win? At that time, the CHP President Kemal Kilçdaroğlu, I want to be a candidate basically. Although this kind of gray is a non -charismatic person. And to bring the votes together, they made other mistakes such as gathering a coalition of six parties, including some very small parties. This was the identity of each side. They called them six tables. Instead of a party, you always had a table of six people fighting. However, Erdogan still won fifty -two percent.
Moreover, IMAMOĞLU defeated Erdogan’s party in the 2019 Istanbul Mayor’s elections. And the AKP did not like the result. Thus, they canceled the election and enabled them to do them again, and at this point, Imamoglu won with an even greater difference. And he won again in 2024. So he can win the election. It has a country -wide reputation – not only Istanbul. And despite all the obstacles of the regime, he managed to do something for the city. For example, he went to all over Europe, talked to mayors and received credit for the transit system by receiving loans from European banks. When the CHP wins a municipality, there are reports claiming that the outgoing AKP administration has evacuated the chests and sold all buildings. So, when the CHP comes, they have nothing. İmamoğlu became very creative. He’s a good speaker. Very modern and relatively young.
He also opened a lot of care. In order to give you an idea of some ridiculous things that have happened right now, there were reports that the government would explore it because it opened up today’s care. A ridiculous thing that just happens is that it cancels the diploma of the university where the university is a degree. You need a university degree to become president.
There are many opposition parties in Türkiye. Democratic decline academicians often talk about the opposition to unite. It’s always useless. It did not work in Hungary and did not work in Türkiye in 2023. Why not?
He seemed to dilute the identity. If it is a strong party and a lot of small parties, what do small parties mean?
Imamoglu can still run from prison for the president, right?
Now there is no university diploma. In general, I think what happened after the Gezi protests in 2013. The Gezi protests were related to a land, a park, a park and a park from the last green areas in Istanbul, where the government wanted to enter a shopping center. There was a violent police reaction and there were protests throughout the country, but it was a kind of scattered and there was no leader. In fact, many protesters were proud of saying that they were not related to parties or groups. They were only people outside. And they were too. The government’s discourse was now the same as discourse. Erdogan is just out and said, oh, these people are vandal. They destroy our inheritance. They cause economic problems for people. And it worked.
However, this time is about voting and significantly your ability to vote. Turks are proud to make elections. And the ability to vote means something. This is not just a park. This is much more existential.
In the last five or six years in Türkiye, there have been many events that Erdogan was expected to surround the popularity of Erdogan’s irregular economic administration or the fact that the government could not protect people from the results of a terrible earthquake in 2023. Now is your understanding that he is more vulnerable? Or did he somehow maintain his popularity?
I’m not sure you can call it true popularity. It has a base, but there are all these surveys that show that young people are really sick and tired. The proliferation of Islamic schools and programs is part of Erdogan’s attempt to shape Islamic moral children. However, young people see how people live on social media and television elsewhere. More than fifty percent of Turkish youth I want to leave country. Now the demonstrations you see are managed by newly owned young people.
Another problem is that the AKP has embraced most of the economy on its own network and it is difficult to find a job without knowing someone at the party. This is important. The fact that the economy has chosen so much means that people fear that they will lose their work if they do not vote for Erdogan. They are afraid that the CHP will come in and shoot everyone and put their own people. And the economy is very terrible now. It is very, very terrible for many people. And they don’t dare to make a change because how little things can disappear. I think it’s part of what brought Erdogan to power.
Do you think Erdogan will win a completely free selection in Türkiye in 2025?
I am almost positive that you will almost not do it.
Staying a step in front of political failure of anti-democratic movements he has made, but is your understanding that the movements themselves direct their popularity? It looks almost like a feedback cycle: you should continue to crack because what you do makes you more popular. Or isn’t that true?
